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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the physical layer secu-
rity in downlink of Power Domain Non-Orthogonal Multiple Ac-
cess (PD-NOMA)-based heterogeneous cellular network (HetNet)
in presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Our aim is to maximize
the sum secrecy rate of the network. To this end, we formulate
joint subcarrier and power allocation optimization problems to
increase sum secrecy rate. Moreover, we propose a novel scheme
at which the eavesdroppers are prevented from doing Successive
Interference Cancellation (SIC), while legitimate users are able to
do it. In practical systems, availability of eavesdroppers’ Channel
State Information (CSI) is impractical, hence we consider two
scenarios: 1) Perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers, 2) imperfect CSI
of the eavesdroppers. Since the proposed optimization problems
are non-convex, we adopt the well-known iterative algorithm
called Alternative Search Method (ASM). In this algorithm,
the optimization problems are converted to two subproblems,
power allocation and subcarrier allocation. We solve the power
allocation problem by the Successive Convex Approximation
approach and solve the subcarrier allocation subproblem, by
exploiting the Mesh Adaptive Direct Search algorithm (MADS).
Moreover, in order to study the optimality gap of the proposed
solution method, we apply the monotonic optimization method.
Moreover, we evaluate the proposed scheme for secure massive
connectivity in 5G networks. Numerical results highlight that
the proposed scheme significantly improves the sum secrecy rate
compared with the conventional case at which the eavesdroppers
are able to apply SIC.
Index Terms— physical layer security, PD-NOMA, Resource
allocation, monotonic optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. State of the art and motivation
T HE increasing demand of high data rates and mul-timedia applications and scarcity of radio resources
encourage operators, research centers, and vendors to devise
new methods and products for providing high data rate services
for the next-generation 5G network. International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) has categorized 5G services into
three categories: 1) Ultra-reliable and low latency commu-
nication (URLLC), 2) enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB),
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and 3) massive machine-type communication (mMTC) [1].
In mMTC, massive number of machine-type devices are con-
nected simultaneously. Services like sensing, monitoring, and
tagging which are in this category have two main challenges:
1) Scarcity of radio resources which make the deployment
massive connections very difficult and 2) broadcast nature
of wireless channels which make the massive connections
insecure. Massive connectivity is one the main features of
future wireless cellular networks which is suitable for IoT [2]
and machine-type communications (MTC) services. In massive
device connectivity scenarios, a cellular BS connects to large
number of devices (in order of 104 to 106 per Km2). To
achieve high throughput and spectrum efficiency, Heteroge-
neous Ultra Dense Networks (HUDNs) is a promising solution
at which the number of BSs per Km2 is very large (about 40-
50) [3]. In order to overcome the scarcity of radio resources
in this category, a new multiple access method called power
domain Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (PD-NOMA) can be
adopted at which users are serviced within a given resource
slot (e.g., time/frequency) at different levels of transmit power
[4], [5]. In this method, users can remove signals intended
for other users which have the worse channel conditions, by
employing successive interference cancellation (SIC) [6]–[8].
It is necessary to mention that SIC concept was first proposed
by Cover in 1972 [7] which is very useful technique, because
it imposes lower complexity than joint decoding techniques
[8]. It is worth noting that the PD-NOMA technique has
attracted significant attentions in both academia and industry,
[9]–[12]. It is necessary to mention that it has been confirmed
in theory domain [13] and system-level simulations [14] which
PD-NOMA surpasses orthogonal frequency-division multiple
access (OFDMA) in different points of view such as device
connections and spectrum efficiency. Based on these benefits,
PD-NOMA is very appropriate to be employed for meeting
the 5G requirements such as massive connectivity [15] which
is very vital for mMTC and Internet of Things (IoT). Besides,
establishment of security in these networks is a dilemma,
because wireless transmission has broadcast nature. Therefore,
private information that is exchanged between transmitter
and receiver is vulnerable of eavesdropping. During the past
years, physical layer security as a promising idea, has been
widely investigated since Wyners presented his work in the
security domain [16]. Furthermore, as IoT is employed in
wide domains such as commercial, military, and governmental
application, security plays an important role in IoT appli-
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2cations [17]. Due to constraints of energy consumption and
limited hard-ware in IoT devices, it is very vulnerable with
respect to eavesdropping. Physical layer security owing to low
computational complexity attracts a lot of attentions and is
becoming a suitable solution for secure communications in
IoT [18].
B. Related works
In recent years, PD-NOMA has been studied from various
perspectives, such as investigating optimal and fair energy
efficient resource allocation in downlink of Heterogeneous
Network (HetNet) for energy harvesting [10], outage perfor-
mance analysis [11], and beamforming based 5G millimeter-
wave communications [12]. Moreover, power allocation en-
suring fairness among users for instantaneous and average
CSI, is investigated in [19]. In [20], PD-NOMA based multi-
ple antennas technology is proposed to improve throughput.
Multiple input single-output (MISO) in PD-NOMA-based
network is investigated in [21]. Additionally, in [3], the authors
study usage of PD-NOMA in HUDNs to backup massive
connectivity in 5G networks. Cost of active user detection
and channel estimation in massive connectivity by employing
massive MIMO is evaluated in [22]. The authors in [23],
propose an inter-cell interference coordination mechanism in
dense small cell networks. Millimeter-Wave PD-NOMA in
machine-to-machine (M2M) communications for IoT networks
is proposed in [24]. The authors in [25] study dynamic user
scheduling and power allocation problem for massive IoT
devices based PD-NOMA.
Recently, physical layer security in single-input single-
output (SISO) systems based on the PD-NOMA technology
is investigated in [27], at which its objective is maximizing
the sum secrecy rate. Physical layer security for PD-NOMA-
based cognitive radio networks is studied in [28]. The authors’
aim is to derive exact and asymptotic expressions of the outage
secrecy rate. Comparison secrecy unicasting rate between PD-
NOMA and OMA is investigated in [29]. The authors study the
achievable secrecy unicasting rate of OMA and PD-NOMA.
Moreover, in [30], the authors study physical layer security of
PD-NOMA in large-scale networks with employing stochastic
geometry, in which a new exact expression of the outage
secrecy rate is derived for single-antenna and multiple-antenna
cases. In the literature, it is ssumed that eavesdroppers know
the channel ordering and are able to perform SIC. It is worth
noting that eavesdroppers by doing SIC are able to decrease
the sum secrecy rate. Hence, to tackle this issue, we propose
a novel scheme such that, we do not allow the eavesdroppers
to be able to perform SIC, even if they know the channel
ordering. Moreover, based on aforementioned discussions,
there are few works in the scope of integration of PD-NOMA
and physical layer security in wireless networks.
C. Contribution
In the following, we summarize the main contributions of
this paper as:
• We consider physical layer security for the downlink
of PD-NOMA-based HetNets and HUDNs consisting of
one Macro Base Station (MBS), multiple Small Base
Stations (SBS), multiple MBS, SBS users, and multiple
eavesdroppers.
• We focus on this aspect of PD-NOMA, “how to avoid
eavesdroppers from doing SIC and when users are able
to perform SIC?”. From the information theory point
of view, user A can perform SIC whenever its received
Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) at user B
is more than user B’s received SINR at its own signal,
[31], [32]. We propose a novel optimization problem such
that, we do not allow eavesdroppers to be able to perform
SIC, even if they know the channel ordering. In this
regard, we formulate an optimization problem at which
we introduce a new constraint called SIC avoidance at
eavesdropper condition and the main aim is to maximize
the sum secrecy rate over transmit power and subcarrier
allocation variables.
• For solving the proposed optimization problems, we
adopt the well-known iterative algorithm called Alter-
native Search Method (ASM) [33]. In this method, the
optimization problems are converted to two subproblems
which one of them has binary and another has contin-
uous optimization variables, in other words, power and
subcarriers are allocated separately. In each iteration of
this method, power allocation problem is non-convex and
subcarrier allocation is Non-Linear Programing (NLP).
We solve the power allocation problem by the Successive
Convex Approximation (SCA) approach. To this end,
we use Difference of two Concave functions (DC) ap-
proximation, to transform the non-convex problem into
a canonical form of convex optimization [34]. Also we
solve subcarrier allocation problem, by exploiting the
Mesh Adaptive Direct Search algorithm (MADS), to
this end, we employ Nonlinear Optimization solver with
MADS (NOMAD), [35].
• In practical systems, availability of all eavesdroppers’
channel conditions at legitimate transmitters are imprac-
tical, hence, we investigate two scenarios: 1) Perfect
Channel State Information (CSI) of eavesdropper, 2)
imperfect CSI of eavesdropper, where BSs do not have
perfect CSI of eavesdroppers.
• We also apply the monotonic optimization method to
study the optimality gap of the proposed solution method
[36]. For this purpose, we convert the optimization prob-
lems to the canonical form of monotonic optimization
problem and finally, by exploiting the polyblock algo-
rithm, we solve the monotonic optimization problem,
globally.
• We also evaluate the proposed scheme for secure massive
connectivity in 5G ultra dense networks. Without loss
of generality, for changing our scenario from HetNet
to HUDN, we need to extend the dimension of system
model. According to [3] and [23], in order to tackle high
dimension complexity of resource allocation in HUDNs,
it is assumed that the transmit power is uniformly allo-
cated to users. Moreover, we show the performance of
uniform power allocation is close to the performance of
our proposed solution.
3D. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present system and signal model, respectively,
and explain our novel idea. Section III provides the detailed
problem formulation at two scenarios: 1) Perfect CSI, 2) im-
perfect CSI. In Section IV, the proposed solution is expressed.
The proposed scheme for ultra dense network is evaluated
in Section V. Our proposed optimal solution is provided in
Section VI. Performance evaluation of the proposed resource
allocation approach is discussed in Section VII, before ending,
the paper is concluded in Section VIII.
TABLE I
LIST OF THE MAIN VARIABLES
variables definition
hfm,n Channel coefficient from BS f to the mth user
on subcarrier n
hfe,n Channel coefficient from BS f to the eth
eavesdropper on subcarrier n
pfm,n Transmit power of BS f to user m on subcar-
rier n
ρfm,n Subcarrier allocation to user m on subcarrier
n in BS f
F Set of BSs, F = {1, 2, ...F}
F Total number of BSs
N Set of total subcarriers, N = {1, 2, ...N}
N Total number of subcarriers
Mf Set of all users in BS f , Mf = {1, 2, ...Mf}
M Total number of users, M =
∑
f∈FMf
E Set of all eavesdroppers, E = {1, 2, ...E}
E Total number of eavesdroppers.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
A. System model
In this paper, we focus on secure communication in the
downlink of PD-NOMA based HetNet. As illustrated in Fig.
1, our system model consists of one MBS, multiple SBSs,
multiple eavesdroppers, multiple MBS, and SBS users. In this
system model, we assume that all nodes are equipped with
Fig. 1. Secure transmission in downlink of PD-NOMA based HetNet.
single antenna. For clarity, the main underutilized variables
in this paper are listed in Table I. Note that f = 1 refers
to MBS. When BS f allocates subcarrier n to user m, the
binary variable ρfm,n ∈ {0, 1} is equal to one, i.e., ρfm,n = 1,
and otherwise, ρfm,n = 0. h
f
m,n = d
−α
m,f h˜
f
m,n is the channel
coefficient between BS f and user m on subcarrier n, where
h˜fm,n indicates the Rayleigh fading, α and dm,f are the path
loss exponent and the distance between user m and BS f ,
respectively. Moreover, hfe,n = d
−α
e,f h˜
f
e,n.
B. Signal model
Employing the PD-NOMA technique, a linear combination
of Mf signals is diffused by BS f to its users, [31]. In other
words, BS f transmits
Mf∑
j=1
ρfj,n
√
pfj,ns
f
j,n on subcarrier n,
where sfj,n denotes the transmitted symbol of the j
th user on
the nth subcarrier by BS f . Without loss of generality, it is
assumed E
{∣∣sfm,n∣∣2} = 1,∀m ∈ Mf , f ∈ F , n ∈ N , where
Mf , N , and F are denoted set of all users in BS, set of total
subcarriers, and set of BSs, respectively. Moreover, E {x} is
the expectation of x. The received signals on the mth user
and the eth adversary, that are located in the coverage region
of BS f , on the nth subcarrier are expressed as
yfm,n = h
f
m,n
∑
i∈Mf
ρfi,n
√
pfi,ns
f
i,n + Z
f
m,n+ (1)
∑
f ′∈F/f
hf
′
m,n
∑
i∈Mf′
ρf
′
i,n
√
pf
′
i,ns
f ′
i,n
and
yfe,n = h
f
e,n
∑
i∈Mf
ρfi,n
√
pfi,ns
f
i,n + Z
f
e,n+ (2)
∑
f ′∈F/f
hf
′
e,n
∑
i∈Mf′
ρf
′
i,n
√
pf
′
i,ns
f ′
i,n,
respectively, where Zfm,n ∼ CN
(
0, σ2
)
and Zfe,n ∼
CN (0, σ2) are the complex Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) with zero-mean and variance σ2, on subcarrier n,
over BS f , at user m and eavesdropper e, respectively.
C. Achievable Rates at the Legitimate Users and the Eaves-
droppers
In order to decode signals, in the PD-NOMA-based system,
users apply SIC [14], [37]. In these systems, user m, firstly
detects the ith user’s message when
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 > ∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2, then
removes the detected message from the received signal, in a
consecutive way. Note that the ith user’s message for user m
behaves as noise if
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2. When user m applies
SIC, its SINR in BS f on subcarrier n can be expressed as:
γfm,n =
pfm,n
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
m,n + σ2
, (3)
4where Ifm,n =
∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′m,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf′
ρf
′
i,np
f ′
i,n and its achiev-
ability rate is given by:
rfm,n = log(1 + γ
f
m,n). (4)
In the PD-NOMA-based system, users are able to perform
SIC, if the following conditions hold [38], [39]:
• SIC can be applied by user m if user i’s received SINR
for its signal is less than or equal to user m’s received
SINR for user i’s signal [31], [32].
• |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2,∀i,m ∈Mf , f ∈ F , n ∈ N , i 6= m.
In other words, user m can successfully decode and remove
the ith user’s signal on subcarrier n in BS f , whenever the
following inequality is satisfied, [42]:
γfm,n (i) ≥ γfi,n (i)∀i,m ∈Mf , f ∈ F , n ∈ N , (5)
|hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
where γfm,n (i) is user m’s SINR for user i’s signal and γ
f
i,n (i)
is user i’s SINR for its own signal. Accordingly, (5) can be
written as follows:
log2

1 +
pfi,n
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n + I
f
m,n + σ2

≥
log2

1 +
pfi,n
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n + I
f
i,n + σ
2

, (6)
for simplicity, we can rewrite (6) to the following inequality:
Qfm,i,n(ρ,p)
∆
= −|hfm,n|2σ2 + |hfi,n|2σ2 + |hfi,n|2Ifm,n−
|hfm,n|2Ifi,n −
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n+
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n ≤ 0.
(7)
We propose a novel resource allocation algorithm in which
eavesdropper is not able to employ SIC to increase its own
achievable rate. In this case, eavesdropper e can not apply
SIC, hence, all users’ messages are treated as interference in
the eth eavesdropper. Therefore, SINR of the eavesdropper e
in BS f on subcarrier n can be obtained as:
γf,me,n =
pfm,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
e,n + σ2
. (8)
where Ife,n =
∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′e,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf′
ρf
′
i,np
f ′
i,n and its achievable
rate is given by:
rf,me,n = log(1 + γ
f,m
e,n ), (9)
For SIC avoidance at the eavesdroppers, the following inequal-
ity must be satisfied:
γf,me,n (i) ≤ γfi,n (i) ,∀i,m ∈Mf , e ∈ E , f ∈ F , n ∈ N (10)
|hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m,
in other words:
log2
1 + p
f
i,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n + I
f
e,n + σ2
 ≤
log2

1 +
pfi,n
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n + I
f
i,n + σ
2

,
(11)
by some mathematical manipulation, (11) is equivalent to the
following inequality:
Ψfm,i,n,e(ρ,p) = −|hfe,n|2σ2 + |hfi,n|2σ2 − |hfe,n|2Ifi,n+
|hfi,n|2Ife,n −
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n+ (12)
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n ≥ 0.
In the following, we assume that the eavesdroppers are non-
colluding, hence we have
rf,memax,n = maxe∈E
{
log(1 + γf,me,n )
}
, (13)
therefore, the secrecy rare at the mth user served by BS f on
subcarrier n can be obtained as follows:
Rsec fm,n =
[
rfm,n − rf,memax,n
]+
, (14)
where [Ψ]+ = max {Ψ, 0}.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we propose a new policy for resource
allocation to maximize the sum secrecy rate. It should be
noted, in practical systems, having knowledge of all eavesdrop-
pers’ CSI is impractical, hence we investigate two scenarios:
1) Perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers, 2) imperfect CSI of
the eavesdroppers, where BSs do not have perfect CSI of
eavesdroppers. We investigate these two scenarios in two
Subsections III-A and III-B, respectively.
5A. Perfect CSI Scenario
In this subsection, we assume the CSI of eavesdroppers are
available in the BSs, which is a common assumption in the
physical layer security literature [40]1. To this end, we propose
a policy for resource allocation to maximize the sum secrecy
rate. In this policy, unlike the users, the eavesdroppers cannot
apply SIC. We formulate the considered optimization problem
of sum secrecy rate maximization via the worst-case robust
approach as follows:
max
P,ρ
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − rf,memax,n
}
, (15a)
s.t. : C1 :
∑
m∈Mf
∑
n∈N
ρfm,np
f
m,n ≤ pfmax ∀f ∈ F , (15b)
C2 :
∑
m∈Mf
ρfm,n ≤ `, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F , (15c)
C3 : ρ
f
m,n ∈
{
0, 1
}
, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , (15d)
C4 : p
f
m,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , (15e)
C5 : ρ
f
m,nρ
f
i,nQ
f
m,i,n(ρ,p) ≤ 0,∀f ∈ F ,
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m, (15f)
C6 : ρ
f
m,nρ
f
i,nψ
f
m,i,n,e(ρ,p) ≥ 0,∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N ,
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m. (15g)
The optimization variables P and ρ are defined as P =[
pfm,n
]
and ρ =
[
ρfm,n
] ∀m ∈ Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , moreover
pfmax is the maximum allowable transmit power at BS f .
Constraint C1 demonstrates the maximum allowable transmit
power of BS f . In order to guarantee each subcarrier can
be allocated to at most ` users, constraint C2 is imposed.
Constraint C4 denotes that the transmit power is non-negative.
Constraint C5 guarantees user m can perform SIC successfully
on users that |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2. Constraint C6 assures that
eavesdropper e is not able to perform SIC, and other users’
signals are treated as interference.
B. Imperfect CSI Scenario
In this subsection, we assume imperfect CSI of eavesdrop-
pers is available in the BSs. In particular, the BSs have the
knowledge of an estimated version of channel i.e., hˆfe,n and
the channel error is defined as ehfe,n = h˜
f
e,n − hˆfe,n. We
assume that the channel mismatches lie in the bounded set, i.e.,
EhE =
{
ehfe,n :
∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ } ∀m ∈ Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
where  is a known constant, [41]. Therefore, we model the
channel coefficient from BS f to the eth eavesdropper on
subcarrier n as follows:∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 =∣∣∣hˆfe,n + ehfe,n ∣∣∣2. (16)
We focus on optimizing the worst-case performance, where
we maximize the worst case sum secrecy rate for the worst
channel mismatch ehfe,n in the bounded set EhE . Hence, the
1It is assumed the eavesdroppers are users of network, which are not
legitimate for accessing some information.
imperfect CSI optimization problem can be formulated as
follows:
max
P,ρ
min
ε
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − rf,memax,n
}
, (17a)
s.t. : C1 :
∑
m∈Mf
∑
n∈N
ρfm,np
f
m,n ≤ pfmax ∀f ∈ F , (17b)
C2 :
∑
m∈Mf
ρfm,n ≤ `, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F , (17c)
C3 : ρ
f
m,n ∈
{
0, 1
}
, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
(17d)
C4 : p
f
m,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , (17e)
C5 : ρ
f
m,nρ
f
i,nQ
f
m,i,n(ρ,p) ≤ 0,∀f ∈ F ,
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m, (17f)
C6 : ρ
f
m,nρ
f
i,nψ
f
m,i,n,e(ρ,p) ≥ 0,∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N ,
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m, (17g)
C7 :
∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ ,∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N , e ∈ E (17h)
where the optimization variable ε is defined as ε =[
ehfe,n
]
,∀e ∈ E , n ∈ N , f ∈ F .
IV. SOLUTIONS OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The optimization problems (15) and (17) are non-convex
because they have binary and continuous variables for subcar-
rier and power allocation, respectively. Besides, the objective
functions are non-convex. Hence, we can not employ existing
convex optimization methods straightly. Hence, to tackle this
issue, we adopt the well-known alternative method [42], to
solve the optimization problems.
A. Solution of the optimization problem in perfect CSI Sce-
nario
As there is the max operator in the objective function, we
use a slack variable υfm,n which is defined as
max
e∈ε
{
log(1 + γf,me,n )
}
= υfm,n, (18)
by applying the epigraph method, the optimization problem
(15) is rewritten as
max
P,ρ,υ
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − υfm,n
}
, (19a)
s.t. : C1 − C6,
C ′7 : log
(
1 + γf,me,n
) ≤ υfm,n ∀e ∈ E , n ∈ N ,
f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf , (19b)
where υ is defined as υ =
[
υfm,n
]
,∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F .
For solving (19), we adopt the well-known iterative algorithm
called ASM. In this method, the optimization problems are
converted to two subproblems which one of them has binary
and another has continuous optimization variables, in other
words, power and subcarrier are allocated alternatively [33]. In
this method, in each iteration, we allocate transmit power and
6Algorithm 1 ITERATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION AL-
GORITHM For PERFECT CSI
1: Reformulate the optimization problem via the epigraph
method
2: Initialization: Set µ = 0 (µ is the iteration number) and
initialize to ρ(0) and P(0).
3: Set ρ = ρ (µ),
4: Solve (45) and set the result to P (µ+ 1),
5: Solve (20) and set the result to ρ (µ+ 1),
6: If ‖P (µ+ 1)−P (µ)‖ ≤ Θ
stop,
else
set µ = µ+ 1 and go back to step 3
subcarriers, separately. In other words, in this iterative method,
in each iteration we consider fixed subcarrier and allocate
power, then, for subcarrier allocation we consider fixed power.
We summarize the explained algorithm in Algorithm 1. As
seen in this algorithm, it is ended when the stopping condition
is satisfied i.e., ‖P (µ+ 1)−P (µ)‖ ≤ Θ, where µ and Θ are
the iteration number and stopping threshold, respectively.
1) Initialization Method: In order to begin the algorithm,
we need to initial vectors P and ρ. For initialization, it
is supposed that the SBSs do not transmit data, i.e., SBSs
at initialization do not serve any users [45], [46]. In other
words, pfm,n = 0 ∀f ∈ F/{0}. Moreover, the subcarriers are
allocated to one MBS user that has the highest secrecy rate.
2) Subcarrier Allocation: The subproblem for subcarrier
allocation with fixed transmit power (which are computed in
the previous iteration) is expressed as:
max
ρ
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − υfm,n
}
,
s.t. : C1 − C3, (20)
C5 − C ′7.
Since this optimization problem is Integer Nonlinear Program-
ming (INLP), we can solve it by exploiting MADS, to this end,
we employ the NOMAD solver [35].
3) Power Allocation: The power allocation subproblem at
each iteration when the subcarriers allocation variables are
fixed, is expressed as
max
P,υ
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − υfm,n
}
,
s.t. : C1, C4 − C ′7. (21)
This optimization subproblem is non-convex because con-
strains C ′7 is non-convex and the objective function is non-
concave. To tackle this difficulty, we utilize the SCA approach
to approximate constraints C ′7 and the objective function.
First, we investigate C ′7:
C ′7 : log
(
1 + γf,me,n
) ≤ υfm,n, (22)
by substitution (8) into (22), we have
log
1 + pfm,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
e,n + σ2
 (23)
− υfm,n ≤ 0,
the left hand side of (23) is written as follows:
log
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
e,n + σ
2 + pfm,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2

− log
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
e,n + σ
2
− υfm,n.
(24)
As seen, (24) is the difference between two concave functions.
Hence, we can employ the DC method to approximate (24) to
a convex constraint. To this end, we write (24) as follows:
Ξf,me,n (P) = =f,me,n (P)− Φf,me,n (P), (25)
where
=f,me,n (P) =
− log
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
e,n + σ
2
− υfm,n,
(26)
and
Φf,me,n (P) = −
log
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + p
f
m,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 + Ife,n + σ2

(27)
=f,me,n (P) and Φf,me,n (P) are convex, by utilizing a linear
approximation, Φf,me,n (P) can be written as follows:
Φf,me,n (P) ' Φ˜f,me,n (P) = Φf,me,n (P (µ− 1)) + (28)
∇TΦf,me,n (P (µ− 1)) (P−P(µ− 1)) ,
where ∇Φf,me,n (P), is the gradient of Φf,me,n (P) which is
defined as:
∇Φf,me,n (P) =
∂
∂P
Φf,me,n (P) = (29)[
∂Φf,me,n (P)
∂pfm,n
]
,∀m ∈Mf ,∀n ∈ N ,∀f ∈ F ,∀e ∈ E ,
and
∂Φf,me,n (P)
∂pca,b
=

X, a = m, b = n, c = f,
Y, ∀a ∈Mf/ {m} , b = n, c = f,
B, ∀a ∈Mf ′ , b = n, c = f ′ ∈ F/f,
0, O.W,
(30)
7moreover, X , Y , and B are calculated as follows:
X = −
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + p
f
m,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 + Ife,n + σ2 ,
(31)
Y = −
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2ρfa,n∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + p
f
m,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 + Ife,n + σ2 ,
(32)
B = −
∣∣hce,n∣∣2ρca,n∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + p
f
m,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 + Ife,n + σ2 ,
(33)
therefore,∇TΦf,me,n (P) is a vector that its length is N×M×F .
After approximation C ′7 to the convex constraint, we convert
the objective function to a concave function by exploiting the
DC method, hence we have:
log(1 + γfm,n)− υfm,n, (34)
by substitution (3) into (34), we have
log(1 +
pfm,n
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
m,n + σ2
)− υfm,n,
(35)
where can be written as:
log(
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
m,n + σ
2+
pfm,n
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2)− log(∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
m,n+
σ2)− υfm,n, (36)
we can writhe (36) as follows:
Ufm,n (P) = G
f
m,n (P)−Hfm,n (P) , (37)
where Hfm,n (P) and G
f
m,n (P) are defined as
Gfm,n (P) = −υfm,n + log (38)
(
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + p
f
m,n
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 + Ifm,n + σ2),
and
Hfm,n (P) = (39)
log
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2
∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
m,n + σ
2
 ,
respectively. Gfm,n (P) and H
f
m,n (P) are concave, by utilizing
a linear approximation we can write Hfm,n (P) as follows:
Hfm,n (P) ' H˜fm,n (P) = Hfm,n (P (µ− 1)) + (40)
∇THfm,n (P (µ− 1)) (P−P(µ− 1)) ,
where ∇THfm,n (P) is calculated as follows:
∇THfm,n (P) =
∂
∂P
Hfm,n (P) (41)
=
[
∂Hfm,n (P)
∂pfm,n
]
,∀m ∈Mf ,∀n ∈ N ,∀f ∈ F ,
We take derivative of Hfm,n (P) with respect to p
c
a,b as follows:
∂Hfm,n (P)
∂pca,b
= (42) Z ∀a ∈Mf/ {m} , b = n, c = f,
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣hfa,n∣∣2,
T ∀a ∈Mf ′ , b = n, c = f ′ ∈ F/f
0 O.W
where Z and T are calculated as follows:
Z = (43)∣∣hfm,n∣∣2ρfa,n∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
m,n + σ2
,
T = (44)∣∣hcm,n∣∣2ρca,n∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
m,n + σ2
.
Consequently, we have a convex optimization problem in the
canonical form, by exploiting the DC approximation, which is
formulated as:
max
P,υ
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P)− H˜fm,n (P)
}
,
(45a)
s.t. : C1 − C7, (45b)
C ′7 : =f,me,n (P)− Φ˜f,me,n (P) ≤ 0 ∀e ∈ E , (45c)
n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,m ∈Mf ,
For solving the convex optimization problem (45), we can use
available softwares, such as CVX solver [43].
4) Convergence of the algorithm: In this subsection, we
prove the convergence of the algorithm and illustrate that
after each iteration the value of objective function f (ρ,p) =
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − υf,me,n
}
, is improved and converged.
Proof : In this algorithm, after applying the third step,
with a given ρ = ρ (µ), the power allocation of iteration
µ + 1 is obtained. According to Appendix I, we will have
f (ρ (µ) ,p (µ)) ≤ f (ρ (µ) ,p (µ+ 1) ). Moreover, in the
fourth step, with a given p = p (µ+ 1), the subcarrier
8allocation of this iteration is obtained. According to this fact
that, after each iteration, subcarrier allocation with feasible
power solution improves the objective function, hence we
have:
... ≤ f (ρ (µ) ,p (µ) ) ≤ f (ρ (µ) ,p (µ+ 1) ) ≤ (46)
f (ρ (µ+ 1) ,p (µ+ 1) ) ≤ ... ≤ f (ρ∗,p∗)
where ρ∗ and p∗ are obtained at the last iteration, [44].
Convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm is shown in
Fig. 5. It should be noted, globally optimal solution is not
guaranteed by this solution even after convergence. Hence, for
finding the globally optimal solution, we utilize the monotonic
optimization method which is explained, in Section VI.
5) Computational complexity: Solution of the optimization
problem (15) consists of two stages 1) Calculation of power
allocation from problem (45), 2) calculation of subcarrier
allocation from problem (20). As we know, CVX software
employs geometric programing with the Interior Point Method
(IPM) [43], hence, the order of computational complexity can
be obtained as:
O
(
log
(
NOC
t∂
)
log (ξ)
)
, (47)
where NOC is the total number of constraints. ∂ , ξ and t
are parameters of IPM. 0 ≤ ∂ << 1 is the stopping criterion
of IPM, ξ is used for the accuracy IPM and t is initial point
for approximated the accuracy of IPM, [45], [47]. Hence, the
complexity order is given by:
O
 log
(
F (1+N(1+M+M(M−1)+ME(M−1)+ME))
t∂
)
log (ξ)
 (48)
B. Solution of the optimization problem in Imperfect CSI
Scenario
For solving (17), first we solve the inner minimization
and obtain ε, then solve the maximization problem according
to Section IV-A. The inner minimization can be written as
follows:
min
ε
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − υfm,n
}
, (49a)
s.t. : C6, C7, C ′7. (49b)
Our aim is to minimize the objective function, to this end,
we should maximize υfm,n. Hence, according to C
′
7, we
maximize lower bound of υfm,n, i.e., log
(
1 + γf,me,n
)
. Since
the logarithmic function is increasing, we can maximize γf,me,n
instead of log
(
1 + γf,me,n
)
. As γf,me,n is fractional, we should
maximize numerator and minimize denominator. To this end,
we use the triangle inequality which is defined as follows:∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 −  ≤ ∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 − ∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣hˆfe,n + ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 + . (50)
By using (50), we can write the upper bound of γf,me,n as
follows:
pfm,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I
f
e,n + σ2
≤
pfm,n
(∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 + )(∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 − ) ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I˜
f
e,n + σ2
. (51)
where I˜fe,n =
∑
f ′∈F/f
(∣∣∣h˜f ′e,n∣∣∣2 − ) ∑
i∈Mf′
ρf
′
i,np
f ′
i,n. Also, we
consider the worst case for constraint C6. According to (50),
we can rewrite the worst case C6 as follows:
Ψfm,i,n,e(ρ,p) ≥ Ψ˜fm,i,n,e(ρ,p) = |hfi,n|2σ2 + |hfi,n|2I˜fe,n−
(∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 + )

∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n + I
f
i,n + σ
2
+
(∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 − ) ∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n ≥ 0. (52)
In the following, we should solve the outer maximization,
which is written as follows:
max
P,ρ,υ
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
rfm,n − υfm,n
}
, (53a)
s.t. : C1 − C5, (53b)
C ′6 : ρ
f
m,nρ
f
i,nψ˜
f
m,i,n,e(ρ,p) ≥ 0,∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N ,
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m, (53c)
C
′′
7 : (53d)
log
1 +
pfm,n
(∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 + )(∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 − ) ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I˜
f
e,n + σ2

− υfm,n ≤ 0, ∀e ∈ E , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf . (53e)
This optimization problem (53) can be solved similar to the
proposed approach in Section IV-A.
V. MASSIVE CONNECTIVITY SCENARIO
In this section, we aim to evaluate the PD-NOMA technique
in ultra dense network for secure massive connectivity in 5G
networks. Without loss of generality, for changing our scenario
from HetNet to HUDN, we need to extend the dimension of
system model. According to [3], [23], and [48], in order to
tackle high dimension complexity of resource allocation in
HUDNs and overcome hardware computation limitations, it
is assumed that the transmit power is uniformly allocated to
devices/users and subcarriers are dynamically allocated.
To know the performance degradation due to the uniform
power allocation, we compare the uniform power allocation
method for a small network dimension with our proposed
9solution i.e., joint power and subcarrier allocation in section
of simulation result. Based on simulation results, we show
the performance of uniform power allocation is close to the
performance of our proposed solution i.e., joint power and
subcarrier allocation in the small network dimension.
VI. OPTIMAL SOLUTION
In this section, our aim is to solve problem (19) by utilizing
the monotonic optimization method. Hence, in this section,
three main steps are performed as follows:
1) Problem (19) is transformed into an optimization prob-
lem at which its optimization variables are only transmit
power.
2) The new optimization problem is converted to a canon-
ical form of monotonic optimization problem.
3) Finally, by exploiting the polyblock algorithm, we solve
the monotonic optimization problem globally.
A. Problem Transformation
For the first step, we assume each subcarrier can be allocated
to at most two users, i.e., ` = 2. Hence, based on constraints
(15c) and (15d), if pfm,n 6= 0 and pfi,n 6= 0, we have pfw,n =
0 ∀m, i, w ∈ Mf , m 6= i 6= w. Therefore, constraint (15c) is
equivalent to
pfm,np
f
i,np
f
w,n ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F , m, i, w ∈Mf , (54)
m 6= i 6= w
Therefore, the optimization problem (19) can be transformed
into a new optimization problem with only transmit power
variables as follows:
max
P,υ
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
{
r˜fm,n − υfm,n
}
, (55a)
s.t. :
∑
m∈Mf
∑
n∈N
pfm,n ≤ pfmax ∀f ∈ F , (55b)
pfm,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N ,m ∈Mf , (55c)
pfm,np
f
i,nQˆ
f
m,i,n ≤ 0,∀f ∈ F , (55d)
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
− pfm,npfi,nψˆfm,i,n,e ≤ 0,∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N , (55e)
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m,
log
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ
f
m,n + σ
2 + pfm,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2
−
log
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ
f
m,n + σ
2
− υfm,n ≤ 0,
∀e ∈ E , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf , (55f)
pfm,np
f
i,np
f
w,n ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F , m, i, w ∈Mf ,
m 6= i 6= w, (55g)
where
Qˆfm,i,n = −|hfm,n|2σ2 + |hfi,n|2σ2 + |hfi,n|2Iˆfm,n − |hfm,n|2Iˆfi,n
− ∣∣hfm,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n+
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n, (56)
and
ψˆfm,i,n,e = −|hfe,n|2σ2 + |hfi,n|2σ2 − |hfe,n|2Iˆfi,n + |hfi,n|2Iˆfe,n−∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n+ (57)
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n,
where Iˆfm,n =
∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′m,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf′
pf
′
i,n and Iˆ
f
e,n =∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′e,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf′
pf
′
i,n. Moreover, r˜
f
m,n is defined as:
r˜fm,n = log

1 +
pfm,n
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ
f
m,n + σ2

,
(58)
B. Monotonic Optimization
In the second step, our aim is to formulate the optimization
problem (55) as a monotonic optimization problem in the
canonical form. As we know, the optimization problem
(55) is a non-monotonic problem because the objective
function is not increasing function and constraints (55d),
(55e), and (55f) are not inside normal or conormal sets.
Since the optimization problem is a problem with hidden
monotonicity [36], we can rewrite the objective function
and non-monotonic constraints to a differences of increasing
function form. Hence, let us reformulate the objective
function as r˜fm,n − υfm,n = gf+m,n − gf−m,n where gf+m,n =
log
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ
f
m,n + σ
2 + pfm,n
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2

and gf−m,n = log
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑|hfm,n|2≤|hfi,n|2
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ
f
m,n + σ
2
+
υfm,n.
We introduce auxiliary variables t1, t2, t3, and t4 to
reformulate (55) as [50], [51]:
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max
P,υ,T1,T2,T3
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
{
gf+m,n + T
f
4,m,n
}
, (59a)
s.t. : (55b), (55c), (55g), (59b)
O+ (P) + T f1,m,i,n ≤ O+
(
Pmask
)
,∀f ∈ F , (59c)
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
O− (P) + T f1,m,i,n ≥ O+
(
Pmask
)∀f ∈ F , (59d)
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
0 ≤ T f1,m,i,n ≤ O+
(
Pmask
)−O+ (0)∀f ∈ F , (59e)
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
Oˆ+ (P) + T f2,m,i,n,e ≤ Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N ,
(59f)
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m,
Oˆ− (P) + T f2,m,i,n,e ≥ Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N ,
(59g)
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m,
0 ≤ T f2,m,i,n,e ≤ Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)− Oˆ+ (0)∀f ∈ F , (59h)
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m,
O˜+ (P) + T f3,m,n,e ≤ O˜+
(
Pmask
)
(59i)
∀e ∈ E , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf , ,
O˜− (P) + T f3,m,n,e ≥ O˜+
(
Pmask
)
(59j)
∀e ∈ E , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf , ,
0 ≤ T f3,m,n,e ≤ O˜+
(
Pmask
)− O˜+ (0) (59k)
∀e ∈ E , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf , ,
T f4,m,n + g
f−
m,n (P) <= g
f−
m,n
(
Pmask
)
(59l)
0 ≤ T f4,m,n ≤ gf−m,n
(
Pmask
)− gf−m,n (0) (59m)
where, Pmask is a vector which is defined as Pmask =[
pf,maskm,n
]
,∀m ∈ Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , where pf,maskm,n is the
transmit power spectral mask for user m on the nth subcarrier,
which is served by the f th BS. Moreover, O+ (P) =
pfm,np
f
i,n(|hfi,n|2σ2 +
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣hfm,n∣∣2 ∑
|hfm,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n +
hfi,nIˆ
f
m,n), O
− (P) = pfm,np
f
i,n(|hfm,n|2σ2 +
hfm,nIˆ
f
i,n +
∣∣hfm,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n),
Oˆ+ (P) = pfm,np
f
i,n(|hfe,n|2σ2 +
hfe,nIˆ
f
i,n +
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑
|hfi,n|2≤|hfl,n|2
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n),
Oˆ− (P) = pfm,np
f
i,n(|hfi,n|2σ2 + hfi,nIˆfe,n +∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf/{i}
pfl,n, ), O˜
+ (P) =
log
(∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ
f
e,n + σ
2 + pfm,n
∣∣hfe,n∣∣2
)
, and
O˜− (P) = log
(∣∣hfe,n∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf/{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ
f
e,n + σ
2
)
+ υfm,n.
According to problem (59), we define two sets as follows:
ℵ1 =
{
(P,υ,T1,T2,T3) : P  Pmask, (55b), (55g),
(59c), (59f), (59i), (59l)} , (60)
and
ℵ2 = {(P,υ,T1,T2,T3) : P  0, (55c), (59d), (59g), (59j),
(59m)} , (61)
in fact, the intersection of sets ℵ1 and ℵ2 is the feasible set of
problem (59), moreover, ℵ1 and ℵ2 are normal and co-normal
sets, respectively, in the following hyper-rectangle, [50], [51]:[
0,Pmask
]× [0, O+ (Pmask)−O+ (0)]× (62)[
0, Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)− Oˆ+ (0)]× [0, O˜+ (Pmask)− O˜+ (0)]
× [0, gf−m,n (Pmask)− gf−m,n (0)]× [0,υmax] .
finally, problem (59) is a monotonic problem in a canonical
form, based on Definition 5 in [51]. Hence, the optimization
problem (59) can be solved by using the polyblock algorithm.
As mentioned way, at which we convert (19) to a canonical
form of monotonic optimization, we can convert (53) to a
canonical form.
C. Computational complexity
In this section we discuss about the computational
complexity of the polyblock algorithm. As we know, the
computational complexity of this algorithm depends on
the number of variables and form of the functions in the
optimization problem. In the polyplock algorithm four main
steps are performed. In the first step, the best vertex should
be found, in the socond step we find projection of the selected
vertex, improper vertexes are removed in the third step, and
new vertex set is found in the fourth step. The dimension
of our optimization problem is =0 = F + NF (3M + 1) +
(M − 1) (M (M − 2) + 3NFM+ 3NFME) +3FNME),
the convergence of algorithm for stopping threshold 10−3,
occurs approximately after =1 = 104 iterations, the bisection
algorithm which gives projection of vertex, with stopping
threshold 10−3, has =2 = 103 iterations, approximately.
Hence, the complexity order can be written as [10]:
O (=1 (=1 ×=0 + =2)) (63)
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate the
performance of the proposed scheme. The simulation parame-
ters are considered as: pmax0 = 16 dB (maximum allowable
transmit power of MBS), pmaxm = 6 dB, ∀m ∈ M/ {1}
(maximum allowable transmit power of SBS), Power Spectral
Density (PSD) of noise is −130 dBm/Hz, α = 4. Maximum
coverage MBS and SBS are supposed 1500 m and 15 m,
respectively.
In Fig. 2, the sum secrecy rate versus the number of
subcarriers is shown. Also this figure compares our proposed
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Fig. 2. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of subcarriers, comparison
between the proposed scheme (SIC avoidance at the eavesdroppers) and when
the eavesdropper can do SIC, M = 3 per km2, F = 2 per km2.
scheme at which the eavesdroppers are not able to perform SIC
with the case they can perform SIC. As seen in this figure,
the sum secrecy rate in our proposed scheme has %82.52 gap
with the conventional type, because in the proposed scheme
we do not allow eavesdroppers to perform SIC, even if they
know the channel ordering, but in the conventional type the
eavesdroppers can perform SIC. This issue is shown for two
different number of eavesdroppers, i.e., E = 4, E = 6.
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Number of subcarriers
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Su
m
 S
ec
re
cy
 R
at
e 
[B
its
/S
ec
 /H
z]
Optimal solution and perfect CSI
Suboptimal solution and perfect CSI
Optimal solution and imperfect CSI, ǫ=0.1
Suboptimal solution and imperfect CSI, ǫ=0.1
Optimal solution and imperfect CSI, ǫ=0.3
Suboptimal solution and imperfect CSI, ǫ=0.3
Optimal solution and  imperfect CSI, ǫ=0.5
Suboptimal solution and imperfect CSI, ǫ=0.5
Fig. 3. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of subcarriers for perfect and
imperfect CSI in the proposed scheme, F = 2 per km2, M = 3 per km2,
E = 2 per km2.
In Fig. 3, we compare the performance of the proposed
scheme for the perfect and imperfect CSI scenarios. Moreover,
this figure shows imperfect CSI sensitivity with respect to the
upper bound of error. As seen, when  = 0.1, the imperfect
SCI scenario has %14.34 gap with respect to perfect CSI. By
increasing  to 0.3 and 0.5, this gap is increased to %17.37
and %31.45, respectively.
Fig. 4, shows the sum secrecy rate versus the number
of eavesdroppers. As seen, with increasing the number of
eavesdroppers in our system model, the sum secrecy rate is
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Fig. 4. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of eavesdroppers, in the proposed
scheme, F = 2 per km2, N = 4, E = 2 per km2.
decreased. This is because, as we know, it is assumed the
eavesdroppers are non-clutsions, therefore, when an eaves-
dropper is added to the system, its channel maybe better
than others, hence the secrecy rate changes (decreases). In
the simulation, we use the Monte Carlo method, therefore
when the number of eavesdroppers is increased, the secrecy
rate decreases on average.
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Fig. 5. Convergence of the proposed algorithm.
Fig. 5 presents the convergence behavior of the proposed
algorithm. We observe that the algorithm converges in iteration
8, in ASM, approximately. In this figure, we assume E = 2
per km2, F = 2 per km2, M = 3 per km2, and N = 2.
In addition, we show optimal solution in all of these
figures. As seen, the proposed suboptimal solution which has
low complexity with respect to the monotonic optimization
problem, is closed to the optimal solution, for example in Fig.
4, the optimal solution has approximately %13.05 gap with
the proposed suboptimal solution.
As mentioned in Section V, for evaluating the performance
degradation due to the uniform power allocation, we compare
the uniform power allocation method for a small network
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Fig. 7. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of BSs in HUDN, N = 48,
M = 300 per km2.
dimension with our proposed solution i.e., joint power and
subcarrier allocation in Fig. 6. As shown in this figure, there
is approximately %9 performance gap between these methods.
In Fig. 7, sum secrecy rate versus the number of BSs
in HUDN for massive connectivity is evaluated. Besides,
this figure investigates effect of number of eavesdroppers in
massive connectivity. As seen, by increasing one BS per Km2,
the sum secrecy rate 2.5 unit increases, approximately.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated physical layer security for
power domain non-orthogonal multiple access based HetNet.
We proposed a novel resource allocation to maximize the sum
secrecy rate in PD-NOMA based HetNet. In the proposed
scenario, the eavesdroppers are not allowed to perform succes-
sive interference cancellation, but the legitimate users are able
to perform it. Hence, all users’ signals in the eavesdroppers
are treated as interference, while some users’ signals can be
canceled in the desired users, therefore, less interference is
experienced by users. In order to solve the optimization prob-
lem, we adopted the iterative algorithm called ASM, i.e., to
convert the optimization problems to two subproblems power
and subcarrier allocation and solve them alternatively. In each
iteration of ASM, we consider fixed subcarrier and allocated
power, then, for subcarrier allocation we consider fixed power.
In each iteration of this method, power allocation problem,
is non-convex and subcarrier allocation is NLP. Hence, we
solve the power allocation by the SCA approach. To this end,
we use the DC approximation, to transform the non-convex
problem into canonical form of convex optimization. Also,
we solve subcarrier allocation, by exploiting MADS, hence
we employ the existing solver called NOMAD. Moreover,
we obtained optimal solution and the optimality gap of the
proposed solution method, by converting the optimization
problems to a canonical form of the monotonic optimization
problem and exploiting the polyblock algorithm. Besides, we
evaluated the proposed scheme for secure massive connectivity
in the massive machine-type communication (mMTC) cases
in 5G networks. As resource allocation in this networks
has high dimension complexity, we allocated the transmit
power uniformly to users and showed the performance of
uniform power allocation is close to the performance of our
proposed solution. Numerical results show the sum secrecy
rate in our novel resource allocation has %82.52 gap with
the conventional type at which the eavesdroppers are able to
perform SIC. Moreover, we investigated imperfect CSI of the
eavesdroppers scenario and compared it with the perfect CSI
case.
Appendix I
In the SCA approach with the DC approximation, a sequence
of improved feasible solutions is generated and is converged
to a local optimum, [52].
Proof : As mentioned, we approximate (39) with function
(40). Gradient of function Hfm,n (P) is its super gradient,
because Hfm,n (P) is a concave function [49]. Hence, we have
Hfm,n (P (µ)) ≤ Hfm,n (P (µ− 1)) + (64)
∇THfm,n (P (µ− 1)) (P (µ)−P(µ− 1)) ,
Therefore, in the objective function, we have:
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P (µ))−Hfm,n (P (µ))
} ≥
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P (µ))−Hfm,n (P (µ− 1))
−∇THfm,n (P (µ− 1)) (P (µ)−P(µ− 1))
}
= max
P
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P)−
Hfm,n (P (µ− 1))−∇THfm,n (P (µ− 1)) (P−P(µ− 1))
}
≥ ∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P(µ− 1))−
Hfm,n (P (µ− 1))−∇THfm,n (P (µ− 1))
(P(µ− 1)−P(µ− 1))}
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=
∑
∀f∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n{
Gfm,n (P (µ− 1))−Hfm,n (P (µ− 1))
}
.
Therefore, after iteration µ, the objective function value either
increases or stays unchanged with respect to iteration µ− 1.
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